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Unions As Complex Organisations 
Strategy, Structure and the Need 
for Administrative Innovation 
Mal col m Warner 
This paper reports the attempt to extend the theory and 
method to the organizational structure of occupationcd inter-
est associations in order to remedy the lacuna in this impor-
tant area of comparative research namely trade unions and 
similar bodies. 
INTRODUCTION 
The présent paper reports the attempt to extend the theory and me-
thod to the organizational structure of occupational interest associations 
in order to remedy the lacuna in this important area of comparative 
research namely trade unions and similar bodies. Earlier conceptuali-
zation by colleagues and myself served to guide the direction of empi-
rical investigation to some degree. We believe this offers a framework 
of analysis within which the organizational problems of trade unions and 
professional organizations could be discussed. Although the data is drawn 
from a British setting, the inferences drawn from it are intended to lead 
to broader generalization. 
Trade Unions are of course, a very spécial kind of complex organi-
zation. This no doubt can be related to their historical background, the 
broad interests they represent, their I WARNER, M., Professer, Henley/ I 
voluntary nature and their gênerai Brunel University, Joint Graduate 
nmitinn in societv and nolitics The Programme in Management Studies, position m society ana pouucs. ine
 T h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t a f f collège, 
range of their activities and resour- Henley-on-Thames, England. 
* This article is based on research carried out in collaboration with Lex Do-
naldson, at the London Graduate School of Business Studies. The project was fi-
nanced by the Social Science Research Council programme grant under the direction 
of Professor Derek Pugh. 
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ces, both being vast, has raised questions as to the degree to which they 
are necessarily « bureaucratized ». Wilensky has observed : 
« The émergence of the staff expert in large-scale organizations, public 
and private, has been seen as the epitome of the bureaucratie trend 
in the modem world. Weber's classic account of the ideal-type bureau-
cracy emphasized thèse characteristics : 
1. Minute division of labour and a clearcut hierarchy of authority : 
the offices are clearly defined, hâve regular activities, governed 
by impersonal rules, and are set off by fixed, officiai jurisdictional 
areas. 
2. The offices are filled by full-time, appointed officiais. The officiais, 
are recruited on the basis of technical qualifications ascertained 
through formai, impersonal procédures (e.g. tests). 
3. The technical specialists who fill the offices are autonomous with-
in their sphère of compétence. 
4. They are politically neutral professionals whose performance of 
duty is independent of personal sentiments and opinions. 
5. Such faithful performance of duty is assured by the rewards of 
stable careers ; regular salary, expectation of promotion, more 
responsibility, salary advance, secure tenure, and a pension... 
However the fact that unions are big does not mean that unions; 
are bureaucratized. » ! 
Whether or not thèse conform to the « idéal type » which is sup-
posée to characterize « bureaucracy » ; the trend to rationalization of the 
means of administration may be there. As Wilensky points out, the unions 
may hâve been slow to hâve developed thèse, but we would still argue 
that there is a recognizable élément of bureaucracy. How far this is the 
case is another question. How does it relate to the size of organizations ? 
What particular managerial problems does it produce? How far does 
demorcracy act as a constraint on efficiency? 
In the American case, Wilensky gives prominence of functional spe-
cialization as a major characteristic of the process he is attempting to 
describe. This is certainly true of the bigger unions as he observes : « The 
bureaucratization process goes forward most clearly in the national head-
quarters of a few large unions. One clue to it is the fréquent, sometimes 
nostalgie, recollections of functionaries who hâve been around since the 
early days. The functions hâve been more clearly defined, » says one. 
1 WILENSKY, Harold L., lntellectuals in Trade Unions, Glencoe, Illinois, The 
Free Press, 1956, p. 243. 
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« More and accurate records are kept of the work of the Department ». 
(Questionnaire.) An old-timer in another union : « In the old days.. . 
Fd get into everything. Now things are différent. We're really big busi-
ness — specialized. I wouldn't dare try to interpret a contract today — 
except my section of it ! » 2 
One of the main problems which face unions is that compared with 
other types of organizations (such as firms) even the large ones are rel-
atively small in terms of the number of staff they employ and it is this 
set of problems as they relate to size which we will now consider. Careful 
analysis of the internai workings of the British trade unions we hâve 
investigated (including the large ones) showed that administrative charac-
teristics can be seen as a function of their size.3 
In the study which has been attempted, we hâve tried to look at the 
administrative characteristics of trade unions and professional associations 
which we hâve called as a group 'occupational interest associations' in 
terms of the measures which hâve been developed from the study of 
business and other organizations. We may summarize the main approach 
as follows : we argue that occupational interest associations are suffi-
ciently similar in their administrative activities to be compared with other 
work organizations — that they hâve an administrative superstructure 
or what some people hâve loosely called a bureaucracy. We hâve at-
tempted to apply the methodology developed by D.S. Pugh and asso-
ciâtes which breaks down the administrative features of organizations 
into specialization, standardization, formalization, centralization and con-
figuration and the previous research investigated the relationship between 
contextual variables such as size and the five above primary structural 
variables. In measuring thèse administrative characteristics of trade 
unions, for example, and relating them to the size of the staff and also 
the membership such research has not intended to give one organization 
good marks or bad marks, but simply record the relationship between 
the variables one with another so as to provide comparative measures 
of their structure. This has been carried out in order to compare the 
scores achieved in business and other organizations studied by the pre-
2 ibid., p. 244. 
3
 The sample studied consisted of three large unions and three small ones, 
plus one professional association. See Malcolm WARNER and Lex DONALDSON, 
« Dimensions of organization in occupational interest associations : Some preli-
minary findings ». Paper to Third Joint Conférence on the Behavioural Sciences 
and Operational Research, London, December 1971. 
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vious research, that is manufactuirng organizations etc., with an entirely, 
ostensibly différent type of organization that is the occupational interest 
group. 4 
In the most detailed séries of comparative studies of bureaucracy 
to date Pugh and his associâtes hâve conceptualized the various consti-
tuents of bureaucracy under five headings.5 
1. Specialization : 
2. Standardization 
3. Formalization 
4. Centralization 
5. Configuration 
the division of labour within the organization, 
the distribution of officiai duties among a num-
ber of positions. 
the extent to which there are procédures, their 
specificity and standardization and the existence 
of the techniques of rationalization (e.g. work 
study, costing Systems). 
the extent of written communications, such as 
documents, handbooks and records. 
the vertical distribution of decisionmaking. 
the 'shape' of the rôle structure, as measured by 
a variety of separate indices, of which two main-
ly concern us hère : 
a. Size - number of employées 
b. Vertical Span - number of levels in the hie-
rarchy - « flat v. tall » hiérarchies 
In the « Aston » schéma, so called because the initial research was 
developed by Pugh and associâtes at the University of Aston in Birming-
ham each of thèse « primary dimensions » has been operationalized into 
a set of scales and sub-scales, which record how bureaucratized the 
organization under study is on each of thèse quantitative measures of 
bureaucratization. An organization which scored highly on ail or most 
of the four primary dimensions (Specialization, Standardization, Formali-
zation and Centralization) would thus be considered to be highly bureau-
4
 See, for the most récent discussion : John CHILD, « Predicting and Under-
standing Organization Structure », Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 18, No 2, 
1973, pp. 168-185. 
5 See D.S. PUGH, D.J. HICKSON, C.R. HININGS and C. TURNER, «Di-
mensions of Organization Structure », Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 13, 
No. 1, 1968, pp. 65-105. 
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cratic. Using separate measures of the différent aspects allows an investi-
gation of how far bureaucracy is in fact unitary i.e. whether a high level 
of one aspect of bureaucracy, necessarily implies a high level of any other. 
Hère we are concerned only with the following scales : Functional Spe-
cialization, the degree to which given fonctions are performed by some-
one who does nothing else ; Overall Standardization, as defined above ; 
Overall Formalization, as defined above ; Overall Centralization, the 
lowest level in the hierarchy at which action on given décision is normally 
initiated ; Autonomy, a subscale of Centralization, which is the degree 
to which décisions hâve to go above the Chief Executive to a higher body 
for prior approval ; and two indices of Configuration : Vertical Span, 
the number of levels in the hierarchy, and Size, the number of employées. 
Research on large samples of organizations has now established 
that thèse analytically independent dimensions in fact fall into two clus-
ters : the first which has been labelled « Structuring of Activities » and 
which comprises Specialization, Standardization, Formalization and Ver-
tical Span, ail positively correlated, either moderately or highly, and a 
second cluster which mainly comprises Centralization and has a négative 
corrélation with the first cluster, of varying magnitude. 6 The relation-
ship of thèse structural variables to a number of contextual variables has 
been examined, and a consistent relationship found with Size or organi-
zation : the Structuring of Activity variables hâve a high positive cor-
relation with Size, and the Centralization variable has a moderate to low 
négative corrélation with Size. Theoretically, thèse findings hâve been 
interpreted as the substitution of impersonal mechanisms of control in 
large organizations for the direct personal control held to be only possible 
in small organizations. 
Thèse results hâve been replicated in a succession of studies in a 
variety of différent sorts of organizations : manufacturing, service and 
local government — and in a variety of locations the West Midlands, the 
United Kingdom as a whole, the United States of America and Canada. 
METHOD 
It is an idiosyncratic feature of the methodology developed by Pugh 
and his colleagues that it is based upon answers by a few informants to 
direct and spécifie questions about relatively indubitable features such as 
the présence or absence of a designated procédure or documents etc., 
6
 Thèse are summarised in CHILD, op. cit. 
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rather than by aggregating the responses of a large number of members 
of the organization to rather thematic questions and inferring the struc-
ture. 7 It is not widely appreciated that most of the questions used are 
about what happens in practice rather than the « abstracted empiricism » 
of the definition-of-the-situation depicted in the 'formai' organization. 
Inquiries about Functional Specialization, for example, related to the 
présence of at least one person who was concerned exclusively with a 
function like recording and control of financial resources in the organi-
zation. The items refer not only to the présence of organizational fea-
tures, such as procédures, but their actual implementation. In seeking to 
extend this methodology to occupational interest associations, the gênerai 
analytic schéma for the comparative study of organization of ail levels 
which was developed by Pugh et al, from Bakke,8 had to be reinterpreted 
only in its operational détails. This involved interpreting what such con-
cepts as 'workflow' and 'operative' meant in the new, industrial relations 
context. Interviews carried out, involved the gathering of qualitative ma-
terial, greatly assisted the final décisions as to how to interpret the above 
concepts. 
THE REFERENTS OF ITEMS 
The problems involved in applying items previously developed for 
use in manufacturing, service, retail and local government organizations 
were less severe than might hâve been expected. This reflects the way 
the items were originally designed to be sufficiently « context-free » to 
allow comparative research across ail organizations and countries. The 
basic structure of the research instrument was preserved, and only a 
limited number of items had to be re-interpreted to be meaningful in 
the industrial relations settings. Ail in ail only marginal changes were 
needed to make the sets of items analytically germane, and immediately 
compréhensible to the officiais of the occupational interest associations 
in question. 
The main findings of our study suggest that the occupational interest 
associations are directly comparable with, say, business firms using thèse 
common measures and that the findings of the earlier study are replicated. 
7 See for example, Richard H. HALL, « The Concept of Bureaucracy : An 
Empirical Assessment », American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1963, 
pp. 32-40. 
8 See E. Wight BAKKE, The Bonds of Organization, New York, Harper, 
1950. 
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One interesting finding is that taking différent types of trade union 
(craft, gênerai, industrial, white collar) and a professional association, 
we find that the main relationships were related to the différences in the 
numbers of employées (paid and full-time) that thèse organizations had, 
rather than stemming from the fact that they were différent in terms of 
type of organization, that is say being a professional association as op-
posed to a craft union. The main différences were related to the fact of 
employing a very small number of people at head office and other centres, 
as opposed to having over 500 people on the pay-roll. Thus the degree 
to which administrative procédures in the union were formalized for 
example, and for that matter standardized and specialized, depended on 
whether the unions were big or small within the range of total people 
employed by such organizations. 
If indeed there was a relative degree of bureaucracy in terms of 
structuring of activity, we consider that this was a way of administering 
increasing size in the same way as it is a feature to be found as much 
in ail kinds of organization and not just trade unions and professional 
associations. Overall standardization is also slightly smaller for occupa-
tional interest associations as opposed to other kinds of organizations. 
The most dramatic change we note is on formalization where occupationaî 
interest associations as a whole hâve scored higher than say business 
firms. Différences on centralization are somewhat reduced but trade 
unions and professional associations are distinctly higher. We conclude 
that trade unions and professional associations seem to be more cen-
tralized and abundant in paper controls and manifest fewer rules and 
procédures and are less specialized along functional Unes than other 
types of organizations. We argue that we might interpret this as indicating 
that relative to organizations of the same size occupationaî interest asso-
ciations hâve more control exercised by their lay committees, which is 
affected directly by the appropriation of a large amount of their decision-
making and more generally by a larger paper flow through which a 
pervasive control of the organization is maintained. 9 
While thèse aspects of occupationaî interest group structure might 
be modified by consciously reducing them in the interests of administra-
tive efficiency, this may not necessarily work because of the représentative 
9 See WARNER and DONALDSON, op. cit., also J. CHILD, R. LOVE-
RIDGE, and M. WARNER, « Towards an Organizational Study of Trade Unions, » 
Sociology, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1973, pp. 71-91. 
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rationale which is embedded in union government and relates to the fact 
that they are démocratie organizations. This is not to say, however, that 
a cost-benefit analysis cannot be applied to certain procédures so that 
one might investigate just how much membership control one might be 
sacrificing against an increase in so-called managerial efficiency, and a 
trade-off could be made between the two.10 
PROBLEMS OF UNION ADMINISTRATION 
Although union administration has in many ways been brought up 
to date, we hâve rarely corne across in our study of selected British trade 
unions concepts and practices which are common in industry, such as 
Systems analysis, programme budgeting, cost effectiveness and stratégie 
planning, for example. We intend hère to comment on several of the 
gaps that hâve seemed apparent even in the large union organizations 
investigated, and to make some suggestions based on thèse points of 
omission. 
Any organization should look at itself from time to time to make 
sure that its aims and policies match each other. In addition, it should 
examine whether the problems it faces now that it has grown can rea-
sonably be tackled by the sort of procédures which grew up in the past 
when, in fact, the problems it faced were on a smaller scale. Businesses 
hâve found that they hâve to plan their activities in a rather more spécifie 
and explicit manner now that they hâve grown to giant size and to 
monitor their progress from time to time in order to ensure some reg-
ularity of évaluation. In order to do this, some attempt at developing 
and making operational a budgeting system to optimize resource allo-
cation has to be thought-out. Furthermore, there is a necessity for those 
at lower levels in the organization to share in the decision-making as to 
how this may be best done. n 
Once this budget has been developed it may also help lower partic-
ipants to develop a clearer set of expectations concerning their anticipated 
10
 This has never been attempted, at least, to the présent writer's knowledge. 
11
 This section draws considerably on an analysis of American trade union 
administration for its analytical framework, but modifies them in attempting to 
see how far it fits the British cases examined. See Derek C. BOK, and John T. 
DUNLOP, Labour and the American Community, New York, Simon and Schuster, 
1970, pp. 138-188. 
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performance. A system of management by objectives is an ancilliary of 
this process and a consultation with lower participants from time to time 
to mutually set goals can help the efficiency of the union. Clearer planning 
can better structure a culture within the union so that the goals of the 
union and those who work within it can be better harmonized. The 
development of a manpower budget within union administration would 
also help the union to recruit more systematically, to relate the back-
ground of présent staff to expected future manpower requirements, and 
provide in-house training if necessary for participants at various levels 
within the union as well as better ways of finding new sources of recruit-
ment 
One cannot prétend that the techniques developped by large busi-
nesses which are seeking to maximize profits can be readily applied 
whole-sale to trade unions and professional associations, although several 
of the principles which hâve been developed in management science can 
be adapted for union use, particularly to large unions. While one may 
readily endorse the necessity for a représentative rationale in the ruiining 
of unions as well as an administrative one, one cannot disregard the 
need for increasing efficiency.12 
In the unions that we exarnined, we did not find any, including the 
very large ones, which carried out some of the practices described earlier 
in the above discussion. We certainly did not find any rigorous and 
continuing use of Systems analysis in any of the trade unions or pro-
fessional associations we looked at and we would argue that there might 
be a case for developing this aspect. We had heard that certain unions 
had had consultants in to look at the administration of the union, but 
this in many cases had raised problems because the outsiders did not 
find the idiosyncratic practices readily understandable. Next we found 
that the administration of union accounts was in many cases very satis-
factorily carried out and indeed many unions spent a great deal of money 
on the auditing procédures used, but it was difficult to find any example 
of budgets that extended more than one year and in some unions the 
budget was very notional indeed. We would think that this might be an 
area which unions could develop and which might resuit in programme 
as well as manpower budgets being discussed and established. 
12
 See J. CHILD et al, op. cit. for an extended discussion on the conflict be-
tween administrative and représentative rationales. 
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When we came to look at cost effectiveness, we found that some 
unions had begun to think about this although the smaller ones had 
not made very much progress in this direction. Even in the case of the 
larger unions although there was great anxiety to give the best value 
possible to their members, there were many obstacles to developing a 
comprehensive programme of cost effectiveness. 
Lastly, the problems of stratégie planning had not been satisfactorily 
tackled to the degree that corporate planning has been in large business 
concerns and one cause of this was that trade union officiais, particularly 
gênerai secretaries, were so overworked that they had even less time 
than top executives to sit down and think as to where they and their 
organization might be going in ten years time. We would think that it 
would be a priority for unions to look at this aspect of their activities 
and to set aside some time in the year for a full discussion of their goals 
and strategy and how their structure might be best related to future 
needs in the context of the 1980s. Whilst short-term pressures may be 
considérable and extremely diverting, nonetheless a more rational ap-
proach to them might well stem from a more considered view of future 
strategy and structure.13 
One approach which might be followed to examine new organizing 
possibilities is a rough cost-benefit analysis. Under the heading of benefits, 
one might break the items down into direct économie benefits such as 
increase in gross fee revenue, then indirect économie benefits such as 
maintaining wage levels of members by bringing workers employée by 
competing employers into the union, and lastly social benefits and the 
political strength which extra members in the union will bring to the 
organization. On the other hand, the costs are for example the follow-
ing : to start with the marginal incréments in organizing costs such as 
hiring new organizers and paying for extra printing of publicity material, 
then the cost of extra staff for servicing new members, and lastly the 
risk of infringements of the Bridlington Agreement as other unions react 
to one's organizing offensive. This sort of approach on the whole may 
not produce précise quantitative figures, but rough estimâtes may be 
calculated, and may refine existing rules of thumb criteria which are 
used. Any economist in the research department of a union worth his 
sait should be able to devise an approximate cost-benefit schedule for 
the executive committee's purposes in estimating where marginal organi-
13 See BOK and DUNLOP, op. cit., pp. 160 ff. 
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zation should be considered. It will on the whole make for a more 
conscious and more systematic considération of organizing opportunities 
and the allocating of union resources as opposed to an ad hoc type of 
appraisal. Target areas should be developed with an overall plan for the 
forthcoming year, and the incréments in membership should be monitored 
on a three-monthly basis to see if thèse are matching up to the proposed 
membership budget as this new instrument might be dubbed. Planning 
budgets may be developed for différent occupational groups within the 
union as well as by région and although the problem of making estimâtes 
is not easy, some planning is better than no planning.14 
Having emphasized the relationship between thèse structural vari-
ables and the size of the union as measured by the number of paid 
full-time employées of the organization, we may conclude that the lim-
itation of applying modem management techniques may be limited by 
the upper limit encountered in the sample, that is that the biggest union 
that we looked at which was a gênerai union, employed no more than 
518 or so people (the smallest union employing no more than 15). The 
other types of organizations looked at in the earlier study employed from 
241 to over 25,000 employées in one study and from 108 employées to 
9,778 in another. It is clear that some of the business firms which were 
looked at there were smaller in the number of people employed than 
the largest union, but nonetheless it is probably likely that such refined 
techniques as stratégie planning and manpower budgeting and so on were 
probably not used in thèse organizations. Given the number of staff 
which were employed in trade union and professional associations ex-
amined, one cannot infer that they performed any better or any worse 
than might hâve been expected in relation to their size, except in the 
sensé that there was slightly more paperwork as we hâve described above 
which we think is probably related to their représentative rationale and 
the intended goal of membership participation and control which unions 
explicitly pursue.15 
On the other hand it does not seem to us necessarily conflicting or 
contradictory for unions to attempt to apply certain administrative tech-
14 ibid., p. 166. 
!5 Ail the unions we studied were 'démocratie bodies, which held élections 
for top posts for example, although the professional association appointed its offi-
ciais, it's représentative bodies were elected. See Lex DONALDSON and Malcolm 
WARNER, « Bureaucratie and Electoral Control in Occupational Interest Asso-
ciations», Sociology, (forthcoming, early 1974). 
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niques particularly if they are large enough within the range of staff 
size which we found in our union s ample and which exists in the total 
universe of British trade unions. The application of Systems analysis, 
programme budgeting, manpower budgeting, cost effectiveness and straté-
gie planning may not necessarily undermine the démocratie or repré-
sentative goals of the union, but on the contrary may strengthen them. 
This can occur in a number of ways, not only by making the union more 
efficient and providing services to members at lower cost, but also in 
making the union as a total System more responsive to the membership. 
It may also increase the overall strength of the union and therefore the 
bargaining power of its members by recruiting more efficiently and ex-
tending the domain of the occupational interest group as a whole. 
We consider that forward planning in relation to financial budgets 
and manpower budgets would be one place where unions could start. It 
is ironie that whereas unions hâve been particularly enthusiastic about 
économie planning as a whole, they hâve fallen far behind firms in relation 
to their own internai corporate planning, and we think that there would 
be no contradiction with the manifest aims of trade unions and profes-
sional associations if they were to develop some interest in this direction. 
This may enable them to reconsider the relationship between strategy 
and structure and provide a better ultimate service to their members.16 
DISCUSSION 
It seems to us that Centralization is the institutional manifestation 
of the démocratie and political ethos of occupational interest associations 
on a 'national' basis of organization. n This had led to an emphasis on 
direct control by the national bodies, the conférences or councils, their 
executive bodies and or sub-committees, on which sit the elected lay 
représentatives. It is thèse « représentative institutions » ; to use the 
Webbs' phrase 18 which provide close supervision of the officiais by the 
laity. And complementarily, (and it may be for this reason) there is 
little use made of the managerial techniques of rationalization : work 
study, costing, budgeting, stock-control, and complex inspection Systems. 
How far is this due to something inhérent in the task of thèse organi-
zations, and how far to simple répugnance of « efficiency » techniques 
as treating people as things ? It is difficult to say, but there is one striking 
exception to this generalization, and this is in the collection, collation 
16 C.f. BOK and DUNLOP, op. cit., pp. 157-160. 
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and auditing of monies, particularly incoming subscriptions the occupa-
tional interest associations hâve highly developed rules, procédures and 
paperwork. The Rules of Association of most unions contain detailed 
régulations about collecting, banking and auditing of funds, the specificity 
of which reads like a parody on Weberian bureaucracy. Thèse rules were 
also required for exogenous reasons, that is conditions of registration 
under the 1971 Trade Union Act « which legalized combinations in re-
straint of trade ». The Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies has to see a 
copy of the rules, and certain détails regarding the safeguarding of mem-
bers fund must be guaranteed.20 Thus the elaborate rule-making and 
constitutionalism is partly due to internai factors, and partly to external 
ones. Significantly, where we hâve encountered computerization it has 
been in this area of work. Indeed, a récent T.U.C. Report21 on Trade 
Union use of computers argued that « As unions grow, either individually 
or by merger and, as important as their Servicing fonctions generally 
expand, and become more complex, then the amount of data or 'raw' 
information to be processed will tend to become unmanageable except 
by the use of electronic data processing. Hence there will be during the 
1970's, an increasing requirement by trade unions for computer facil-
ities ». One relatively well-known on-going example is the 'check-off 
whereby the employer deducts subscriptions at source and sends them 
directly to the union headquarters together with a print-out of members. 
A complementary use of computers by the unions themselves is to main-
tain a detailed up-to-date listing of members by branches, this enables 
a check to be made on the financial returns made by the branches. This 
analogous to accounting devices, such as till-records, which are used 
by commercial firms to check that ail income flows to the firm. This 
development has received criticism as leading to reduced personal con-
tact between member and association, for previously a collecting steward 
would typically go round ail the members in his branch or place of 
17
 This was due to the early development of the nationally-elected executive 
committee's powers. 
18
 Sidney and Béatrice WEBB, lndustrial Democracy, London, Longmans, 
1897. 
19 See Benjamin C. ROBERTS, Trade Union Government and Administration 
in Great Britain, London, Bell, 1956, p. 15. 
20 ibid., p. 19. 
21
 This is discussed in lndustrial Relations Review and Report, (London), 
No. 9, June 1971, pp. 10-12. The report was an internai one prepared for the 
T.U.C. Production Committee and it claims that computers can even «reinforce» 
union democracy. 
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work, and exchange information whilst gathering the « subs ». 22 Not ail 
Shop Stewards, however, collect monies and indeed there is sometimes 
a division of labour as between the différent types of stewards. 23 
Whatever the emotional overtones of « business techniques », rules, 
files and computers are in use by unions. And indeed today, even the 
use of such techniques as work study are not opposed by the organisations 
examined, many of which undertake programmes of éducation for their 
members in thèse methods, so that their représentatives can negotiate 
with management from within the world-view of the human engineer. 
Despite this accommodation, none of the organizations sampled were 
specifically using work-study on their own employées. 
On the « out » side of cashflow, there is also a very tight control 
with little authority to spend money being delegated to officiais by the 
national committees. The data suggested that trade union officiais, even 
senior ones, were very unlike managers in this respect. Historically, this 
has been the conséquence of the problems of malfeasance and ernbezzle-
ment which unions experienced in the nineteenth century. It can be 
argued that the modem, or « New Model » form of union organization, 
dating from the 1850's was a spécifie attempt at organizational design 
to de al with thèse problems. The organizational strategy which was formed 
then as a response to thèse problems also seems to hâve perpetuated in 
a relatively unchanging way. Whereas in business firms there is délégation 
of authority over resources, concomitant with Systems to monitor whether 
this authority is exercised wisely and efficiently, by checking on the ratio 
of outputs produced to inputs, for example profit produced to capital 
used, there do not appear to be any corresponding measures of output 
in use in occupational interest associations. While they are concerned 
with not losing money, gaining members, and increasing their service 
to members : - there is no set of quantitative indices, no operationali-
zation of goals and ordering of one sort of goal with another. Instead 
thèse issues are considered and debated by the national committee without 
arriving at a solution, that is consistent over time, and the officiais are 
left to implement the spécifie directives of their governing bodies, rather 
than to exercise discrétion within a framework of a generally defined 
cost-benefit matrix. We are not saying that officiais do not influence the 
22 See ROBERTS, op. cit., p. 77. 
23 Geoffrey GOODMAN and Terry WHITTINGHAM, Shop Stewards in Bri-
tish Industry, London, McGraw Hill, 1969, p. 4. 
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décision of the governing body ; clearly they do, and we might wonder 
whether they exercise a pressure for a more consistent and delegatable 
type of control of the kind outlined hère. Certainly Weber saw the offi-
ciais as exerting this kind of pressure for systematization and ration-
nalization. 
Occupational interest associations may indeed be said to be multi-
goal bodies, and it is this which prevents their full development along 
the Unes of business enterprises. They are less rationalized because of 
their lower-level of differentiation in terms of their function in the wider 
society. The societal variables may be as important as the organizational 
ones hère, as we know that American unions of comparable size are 
more 'rationalized' and 'business-like' in their organisation,24 and better 
serviced in terms of the full-time officer/member ratio. 25 If they were 
really « business unions », seeking to maximise the profit on the service 
they sold to their members, they would be perhaps more fully assimilated 
to the business pattern of organization, in British society at least. But 
they are not, they retain political fonctions in that they hâve not fully 
resolved the conflicting demands placed on them by their members in 
terms of their concern for material or idéal interests, in spite of writers 
like Goldthorpe et al26 who hâve stressed the instrumental orientation 
to work and to the union, by the so-called 'affluent worker'. In terms of 
the Parsonian schéma of the fourphase of problems, occupational interest 
associations straddle both the adaptation and the goal attainment func-
tions of society. In other words they not only perform spécifie services, 
but also provide an opportunity for the expression of demands for con-
trol and power. As labour relations become more bureaucratized, the 
need for 'expressive' leadership 27 may well grow. One General Secretary, 
answered in reply to questions about whether they had an inspection. 
« We hâve the best inspection System of ail ; the members are our in-
spection System and if they don't like what we're doing they soon let us 
know ! » They exemplify the way making organizations self-governing 
checks the trend of differentiation in society. 
24 BOK and DUNLOP, op. cit., p. 138. 
25 Seymour Martin, LIPSET, « Trade Unions and Social Structure : I » In-
dustrie Relations (Berkerley), Vol. 1, No. 1, 1962, pp. 75-89. 
26 John H. GOLDTHORPE et al, The Affluent Workers, Cambridge, C.U.P., 
1968. 
27 See Amitai ETZIONI, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, 
Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1961, p. 115. 
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Les syndicats en tant qu'organisations complexes 
L'article suivant se propose d'étudier les syndicats en tant qu'organismes bu-
reaucratiques ou en voie de bureaucratisation à partir d'un certain nombre de 
facteurs d'appréciation qui s'appliquent à l'entreprise privée. 
À cause de leur origine, de leur caractère d'associations volontaires et de leur 
place dans la vie sociale et politique, les syndicats se présentent comme un type 
d'organisation fort complexe. Aussi, s'est-on interrogé pour savoir dans quelle me-
sure ils pouvaient être bureaucratisés. 
Pour déterminer la tendance à la bureaucratisation Weber a aligné les carac-
téristiques suivantes : division prononcée du travail, tracé distinct des lignes d'auto-
rité, définition précise des fonctions, réglementation impersonnelle, recours à un 
personnel permanent recruté selon des normes de qualification technique, autonomie 
des employés dans la sphère de leur compétence, exécution du travail en faisant 
abstraction de toute opinion et de tout sentiment personnels, obtention assurée de 
l'avancement au fur et à mesure que progresse la carrière. 
Les syndicats ont pu être lents à s'engager dans cette voie, mais la tendance 
existe, plus ou moins marquée selon l'ampleur des organismes. Suivant Wilensky, 
la forme la plus apparente de bureaucratisation dans les syndicats consiste dans la 
spécialisation du travail à tel point qu'un vieux permanent pouvait dire : « Autrefois, 
je faisais de tout, aujourd'hui, je ne me hasarderais pas à interpréter une convention 
collective dans un domaine autre que celui qui me concerne ». 
À partir de ces préalables, l'auteur a essayé de dégager les caractéristiques maî-
tresses des association professionnelles et des syndicats en considérant que ceux-ci 
exercent une activité que peut se comparer avec celles des entreprises ordinaires et 
que, par conséquent, il était possible de recourir à la même méthodologie. Cette 
méthodologie, mise au point par D. S. Pugh et ses associés, considère les organisa-
tions administratives en regard des cinq aspects suivants : la spécialisation, la stan-
dardisation, la formalisation, la centralisation et la configuration. 
Par spécialisation, on entend la division du travail à l'intérieur de l'organisation 
et le partage des responsabilités entre les différentes fonctions ; par standardisation, 
le degré auquel on recourt aux techniques de rationalisation du travail ; par forma-
lisation, le degré d'utilisation des communications écrites internes et externes ; par 
centralisation, la structure de fonctionnement du processus de décision ; par confi-
guration, le contenu de la structure de l'organisation comme le nombre d'employés 
et le nombre de niveaux au sein de la hiérarchie. 
Les principaux résultats de l'étude confirment l'hypothèse que le fonctionne-
ment des groupements s'occupant du secteur des relations professionnelles peut se 
comparer à celui des entreprises industrielles. Far ailleurs, lorsqu'on compare entre 
eux les différents types de syndicats (syndicats de métier, syndicats industriels, syn-
dicats de cols blancs) et les associations à caractère strictement professionnel, on 
découvre qu'ils se différencient surtout par le nombre d'employés. D'autre part, les 
variantes que l'on observe entre les diverses associations dépendent de leur impor-
tance. Plus le nombre des employés est considérable, plus la bureaucratisation est 
forte. 
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En considérant les divers aspects énoncés ci-dessus, on se rend compte que le 
seul qui donne des signes de bureaucratisation plus grands dans les syndicats que 
dans l'entreprise privée, c'est celui de la formalisation. On peut en conclure que le 
degré de contrôle des décisions par la direction y est plus grand. 
Cette étude a aussi permis à l'auteur de faire un certain nombre de constatations 
au sujet des problèmes d'administration dans les syndicats britanniques. Il y a 
découvert que, même si l'administration est généralement à point, on n'y recourait 
guère, par exemple, aux procédés d'analyse des systèmes, de budgétisation pro-
grammée, de planification stratégique, etc. 
L'utilisation de ces méthodes scientifiques permettrait aux syndicats de mieux 
planifier leur activité, d'optimiser l'allocation de leurs ressources, de diffuser à 
travers la chaine hiérarchique le processus des décisions, d'obtenir une participation 
plus efficiente des personnes placées à la base de la ligne hiérarchique, de mieux 
harmoniser les buts recherchés par l'organisme syndical. De même, l'établissement 
de prévisions budgétaires aiderait les syndicats à faire leur recrutement d'une ma-
nière plus systématique, à prévoir leurs besoins futurs en personnel, à mettre en 
vigueur au besoin un système de formation en milieu de travail. 
En réalité, nous n'avons trouvé dans aucun des syndicats auprès de qui l'en-
quête a été faite d'analyse des systèmes rigoureuse. Si nous avons constaté que, en 
règle générale, les syndicats sont administrés d'une façon très satisfaisante et qu'on 
y dépense de fortes sommes à des fins de vérification, les recours à la budgétisation 
programmée en longue période est à peu près inexistant. Les prévisions budgétaires 
ne s'étendent pas au-delà d'une année. Pour ce qui a trait à la recherche d'une 
meilleure utilisation des ressources, même si certains syndicats parmi les plus im-
portants se préoccupent de fournir de meilleurs services à leurs membres, on n'a 
guère rien entrepris de systématique dans ce sens. C'est la même chose en ce qui 
touche la planification stratégique. On se rend compte que les secrétaires généraux 
sont surchargés de besogne et qu'un effort sur ce point devrait être une priorité 
pour les syndicats. En matière d'analyse coûts-avantages, on n'est pas plus avancé. 
Sans doute n'est-il pas possible, compte tenu de la nature de l'activité syndicale, 
d'arriver à des chiffres précis, mais l'utilisation de cette méthode permettrait de 
« raffiner » un peu celle du bon vieux pifomètre. 
Le recours à ces méthodes scientifiques ne devrait pas d'autre part avoir pour 
conséquence de saper le caractère démocratique et représentatif des syndicats, mais, 
au contraire, de le renforcer. Il peut en outre en augmenter leur puissance et accroî-
tre le pouvoir de négociation de leurs membres et rendre ainsi plus eficace le syn-
dicalisme. Il est amusant de constater enfin que les syndicats, qui sont si favorables 
à la planification économique, se soient tellement laissés distancer par les entreprises 
dans l'organisation et la modernisation de leur propre administration. 
